

BRAZIL'S DIFFICULT ROAD TO GREATNESS

BY

MR. DAVID C. WOLFE
United States Foreign Service

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

BRAZIL'S DIFFICULT ROAD TO GREATNESS

by

Mr. David C. Wolfe
United States Foreign Service

Dr. Gabriel Marcella
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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Brazil is an emerging country that has made important strides in consolidating its democracy, constructing a diversified and financially sound economy, and enhancing its diplomatic participation on the world stage. Brazilians have always dreamed of achieving what they believe to be their destiny of greatness. Continuing problems of social inequalities, weak political and social institutions, inadequate education and health systems, and widespread corruption inhibit attainment of that destiny. This paper uses a strategy formulation model to examine Brazil's national interests and grand strategies. A fundamental debate among Brazilians is whether the grand strategy should be pursuit of leadership of the developing world, or of junior membership in the developed world. Strengths and weaknesses of Brazil's national elements of power are also analyzed. Although Brazil's quest for greatness has often strained relations with the U.S., productive bilateral relations can best be nurtured by giving Brazil its international space and maximizing shared interests while minimizing differences.

BRAZIL'S DIFFICULT ROAD TO GREATNESS

We want to stop being the leading country of the Third World to join the group of the First World.

—President-elect Fernando Collor, 1990¹

Brazil is a continental-size country, the largest in Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. It has a population of over 180 million, abundant natural resources, a dynamic democratic system, and the tenth largest economy in the world. It also has numerous political, social, and economic problems, including poverty, social inequality, and an inadequate educational system, all of which impede realization of the country's full potential. Brazilians have always believed their destiny is to become one of the world's great powers. This dream has often been frustrated, however, by having insufficient national power to attain the country's lofty national objectives. This paper examines Brazil's national values, interests and strategic vision and how they have been translated into national strategies, with a view to how the United States and Brazil have accommodated each other and the implications that Brazil's quest for greatness have for U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. Army War College strategy formulation model starts with a country's national purpose (enduring beliefs, ethics, and values), from which are derived a country's national interests, and subsequently a grand strategy/strategic vision and national policy. National strategies are derived from national policy and consist of national objectives (means), strategic concepts (ways), and national power (means).² Applying this model to Brazil, we can find the state's official purpose in the preamble to the 1988 Constitution: to ensure the exercise of social and individual rights, liberty,

security, well-being, development, equality and justice as supreme values of a fraternal, pluralist and unprejudiced society, founded on social harmony and committed, in the domestic and international orders, to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Article One of the Constitution establishes the “indissoluble union of the states” founded on the fundamental principles of “sovereignty, citizenship, dignity of the person, the social values of labor and free enterprise, and political pluralism.” Article Three lists the fundamental objectives of the Republic: to build a free, just and equitable society; to guarantee national development; to eradicate poverty; and to promote the well-being of all without prejudice. Article Four enshrines Brazil’s national values in its international relations: national independence, respect for human rights, self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, equality of states, defense of peace, peaceful settlement of disputes, repudiation of terrorism and racism, cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind, and the granting of political asylum. Article Four also establishes the country’s vision of regional integration, stating that Brazil “shall seek the economic, political, social, and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America, with a view toward the formation of a Latin American Community of Nations.”³

Brazil’s Destiny: Poised on the Brink of Greatness

Unwritten in the constitution but interwoven throughout Brazil’s history, however, is the idea of the country’s destiny of greatness (*grandeza*). Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Carlos de Meira Mattos declared in 1970s: “We possess all the conditions that enable us to aspire to a place among the world’s great powers,”⁴ while the national anthem proclaims a future as great as the country’s size. Darcy Ribeiro wrote of the fusion of Portuguese, Indians and black Africans into a new people in

search of their destiny, fighting for self-awareness and to realize their potential. He proclaimed Brazil the “tardy, tropical new Rome,” open to the future, “building ourselves in the struggle to flourish tomorrow as a new civilization,” whose destiny was to lead Latin America in opposition to the domination of Anglo-Saxon America.⁵ Brazil’s military government (1964-1985) conducted an extensive public relations campaign called Great Brazil (*O Brasil Grande*), telling the public it was time to fulfill Brazil’s destiny to be a great power on the world stage and harkening back to early twentieth century enthusiastic nationalists Afonso Celso and Olavo Bilac.⁶

Brazilians have frequently swung between extremes of optimism and pessimism. One high point was the inauguration in the sparsely settled interior of the new capital Brasilia in 1960 after just four years of construction, with visionary President Juscelino Kubitschek determined to force “50 years of development in five. “ Kubitschek successfully inspired Brazilians to share his vision and accept inflation and hardships by giving them an immediately understandable symbol of future possibilities.⁷ On the opposite extreme was the era of high inflation and stagnation of the 1980s and early 1990s. Former minister, two-time presidential candidate, and current Governor of São Paulo state Jose Serra captured the pessimism of the times when he said, “what exists today is the concrete possibility that the future could become the big victim of the present.”⁸ Reflective of persistent cynicism about the political class is the quip that “our country grows at night when the politicians sleep,”⁹ while Brazilians’ overall frustration about delays in fulfilling their destiny of greatness is captured in the joke they frequently tell: “Brazil is the country of the future, and always will be.”

Brazilian Values and the Shaping of Brazil's Strategic Culture

In discussions of national values and characteristics, Brazilians are frequently described as exuberant, impatient, compassionate, hospitable, extroverted, informal, spontaneous, family-oriented, good-natured, proud, and desirous of avoiding direct confrontation.¹⁰ Though coming across as humble, one frequently hears the boast in Brazil about being the best or biggest (*o melhor do mundo*) at one thing or another. Brazilians, burdened by the Portuguese legacy of heavy and inefficient bureaucracy, are experts at getting things done by finding a way (*jeito*) around obstacles while appearing to obey rules and laws frequently perceived to be non-sensical.¹¹ Roberto da Matta summed up contradictory Brazilian values when he wrote that Brazilians “know that destiny exists and yet have faith in study, education, and the future of Brazil.”¹²

German writer Karl von Martius, who traveled extensively in Brazil in the early nineteenth century, was the first to appreciate that Brazil's unique qualities and values were derived from the cultural and racial fusion of native Indians, imported black African slaves, and white European settlers.¹³ This “lusotropical civilization” described by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre created a new national culture and national identity bound together by this racial mixture, a common language (Portuguese), and a common religion (Catholicism).¹⁴ Brazilian national unity is derived from a common history and a belief in a similarly common future.¹⁵ On the other hand, Brazil's legacy of colonialism, slavery, and sharp divisions between haves and have-nots produced deep social fissures and “feelings of insufficiency” where, according to Jose Bonifacio, the possible exceeds the real.¹⁶ The concept of “two Brazils,” which was coined by Frenchman Jacques Lambert,¹⁷ is often used to contrast the chasm between rich and poor, whether comparing the wealthier south and southeast with the impoverished northeast,

sophisticated international agribusiness with subsistence farming, or glamorous high life in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo adjacent to miserable poverty in the urban slums (*favelas*).

Strategic culture is how nations filter information in ways that influence strategy and includes national values, attitudes, preferences, and geography.¹⁸ Complementing the discussion of Brazilian values above, former Foreign Minister Celso Lafer's essay on Brazilian identity and foreign policy offers a good explanation of other aspects of Brazilian strategic culture. Lafer lists certain "persistent factors" that impact on the way Brazil interacts in the international arena: geography (a continental country occupying half of South America with a beckoning frontier, bordering ten smaller countries and having an extensive coastline); a single language (different from the Spanish of its neighbors); remoteness from points of global tension (e.g., far from the centers of the world wars and the cold war); Brazil's position as a medium power; and the challenge of development.¹⁹ Lafer discusses the first stage of Brazilian history, what Brazilian diplomat Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa called the search for the "consolidation of national space," as the effective occupation of territory and its defense. Revered Foreign Minister (1902-12) Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos, commonly known by his aristocratic title Baron Rio Branco, brilliantly delineated Brazil's boundaries with its neighbors on favorable terms through a series of negotiations in a style of diplomacy Brazil still uses called "constructive moderation," which "de-dramatizes the foreign policy agenda by reducing conflicts, crises and difficulties to their diplomatic bedrock."²⁰

The next stage of Brazilian history (after the consolidation of boundaries) Lafer calls the "development of national space," which attempts to replace "classic borders of

separation with modern borders of cooperation” in Brazil’s relationships with its neighbors and the rest of the world.²¹ Brazil’s assertion that it has “general interests” traditionally associated with great powers, as opposed to “specific interests” of smaller powers, “would become a constant trait of the Brazilian international identity during the twentieth century.” This assertion resides in Brazil’s “diplomatic competence” in making its presence felt in international life as a “medium-sized power of continental dimensions and regional relevance.” Medium powers are not so weak as to be subject to invasion, as small powers are, yet are not so great as to provoke envy or be a “scary monster country” with an excess of power that is a threat to its neighbors. Being in the middle, Brazil can find the balanced middle ground and articulate consensual solutions useful to the international community with an “international presence on the basis of confidence.”²²

Lafer also analyzes Brazilian nationalism, which is oriented toward internal integration of the country’s great national space and is not expansionist against its neighbors. It is a “nationalism of ends” that channels Brazilian foreign policy toward “preserving the freedom to interpret the country’s reality and to find Brazilian solutions to Brazilian problems,” as well as to “identify external resources that could be mobilized” to achieving the end of national development.²³ President Getulio Vargas, for example, pursued the latter objective by obtaining a loan from the U.S. to create Brazil’s steel industry in return for Brazilian support against the Axis in World War II.²⁴

Philip Raine asserts that, in developing their “national space” on the international scene, Brazilians are convinced their country has a special role to play in the world based on their “peaceful international history, pragmatic adjustments to world realities,

and the negotiating skills of their diplomats. Brazilians like to think of themselves as a pacific, reasonable people who have made valuable contributions to the maintenance of peace among other countries.” Raine also quotes Ambassador Meira Penna’s warning against too much “poetic license” in such romantic attitudes about Brazil’s handling of its international problems, noting that Brazil failed to conquer Uruguay in the 1820s only because it was defeated in battle, and that the seizure of Acre from Bolivia in 1903 was coerced.²⁵

Brazil's Core National Interests

Now that we have examined Brazil’s national purpose and values, we can look at the second step in the national strategy formulation model, which is the definition of national interests. Brazilian historian and writer Jose Rodrigues enumerated the following Brazilian “aspirations” or interests: independence and sovereignty; territorial integrity; effective occupation of the entire national territory; national unity; a balance between centralism and regionalism; improved communications and transportation; the psychological integration of all Brazilians through miscegenation, racial tolerance, and acculturation of immigrants; social justice; democratic, representative government; diminution of the powers of the oligarchy; economic development; universal education; and improved health care.²⁶ These national interests can be grouped into three main categories: political, economic, and social, which will be examined in more detail below.

Much of Brazilian history revolves around the struggles to establish a stable and functioning political system and a viable model for economic growth. Brazil’s history is unique in Latin America, with the 1808 transfer of the Portuguese royal court to Rio de Janeiro during the Napoleonic Wars, followed by independence in 1822 under a

member of royal family crowned as emperor. As the new country sought to delineate its borders and populate its territory (consolidation of national space, described above by Lafer), it suffered numerous revolts as Brazilians tried, through eight constitutions, to get the right balance of power between the central government and the states and to develop a viable democracy. Although Brazilians acknowledge that their political system needs reform of the political party system and congressional representation, and that political corruption remains a serious problem, they are justifiably proud of their vibrant democracy and its balanced federal system.

Regarding economic national interests, Brazil has successfully diversified its economy. The boom and bust cycles of mineral and agricultural raw material exports (dye-wood, sugar, cotton, gold, diamonds, coffee, rubber, iron ore) have been replaced by sophisticated, export-oriented agribusiness (sugar, ethanol, orange juice, soybeans, coffee, cattle, chicken, timber), minerals (iron ore, aluminum), and industrial products (aircraft, various machinery). The import substitution model has largely been superseded by a more open economy that has welcomed foreign investment and that privatized many inefficient state-run enterprises. For three consecutive administrations over a 14-year period, Brazil has followed sound macroeconomic policies that have laid the groundwork for growth without crippling inflation or financial instability. These policies, implemented by Finance Minister (and subsequent President) Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994, broke the back of erratic “flight of the chicken” financial and economic fluctuations of earlier decades.²⁷ Nonetheless, higher economic growth is constrained by numerous obstacles, collectively called the Brazil Cost (*custo Brasil*), that include high interest rates, high taxes, corruption, poorly educated workers,

oppressive red tape, inconsistent regulatory and judicial decisions, transportation bottlenecks, lack of intellectual property protection, and overly restrictive labor market conditions. Correcting these problems will require significant political will and leadership.

Brazil continues to face serious challenges in meeting its social national interests. Many Brazilians live in poverty, with the gap between rich and poor one of the greatest in the world. The public education system is completely inadequate, with high drop-out rates and a public university system largely inaccessible to the poor. The public health system is likewise poorly funded and deficient. Violent crime is a critical national concern, as dramatized by the 2006 mayhem caused in São Paulo by the rampaging First Capital Command (*Primeiro Comando da Capital* – PCC) gang, which left hundreds dead,²⁸ and by periodic drug violence in Rio's sprawling, crime-infested slums. Brazil's much-touted racial harmony (*democracia racial*) is belied by festering but subtle discrimination based on class lines, which closely mirror color lines.

Brazil's National Security and International Interests

Focusing more specifically on Brazil's international and national security interests, we can elaborate three main national interests about which there is broad consensus: 1) Secure borders/territorial integrity; 2) Effective occupation of national territory; and, 3) Achieving great power status on the world stage (corresponding to Lafer's "development of national space"). Although Brazil's borders were definitively delineated in the early twentieth century, the Brazilian government and military remain concerned about violations of borders by transnational criminal groups, as well as about maintaining

sovereignty over the Amazon basin. Concern about control over the Amazon still drives national strategy to effectively occupy that vast region, an issue discussed below.

Regarding fulfilling Brazil's destiny of greatness, there have always been consensus on achieving that goal as well as differences on how to get there. Former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon states that Brazil's national goal is to make it into the developed First World, which requires simultaneous success in four policy challenges: 1) macroeconomic stability and high economic growth; 2) major reduction in poverty and income disparities; 3) consolidation of economic relationships with Latin America and the rest of the world; and, 4) reform of political party structures and electoral mechanics.²⁹ Brazil has made significant strides in consolidating macroeconomic stability and democracy, and has advanced in other areas, but still needs to establish the conditions for sustained high economic growth, poverty reduction, further consolidation of trading relationships, and modernization of its political system.

Brazil's Grand Strategies: First in Third World v. Last in First World

In the next step of the strategy formulation model, grand strategy is derived from national interests. The U.S. Army War College defines grand strategy as the use of all national elements of power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of the country's role in the world that will best achieve national objectives.³⁰ A common thread among the various grand strategies Brazil has utilized has been the need to acquire independent means, usually via a tradeoff with a world power, to better control its destiny. Lafer termed this "emancipation through development," seeking "autonomy from a distance" by exploiting areas of opportunity offered by the competitiveness of

bipolarity, with an emphasis on multilateral fora that offer the best possibilities for Brazil to defend its national interests.³¹

To secure its independence in 1822 from Portugal and obtain recognition from Great Britain, the leading economic power of the day, Brazil was obliged to assume a burdensome debt and accept restrictive trade policies with Britain until 1844. To reduce British tutelage, Brazil developed a closer relationship with the emerging world power of the U.S. at the beginning of the 20th century. Brazil pursued an import substitution model (especially from 1945 to 1964) to develop a broad-based industrial sector, as well as developing its own petroleum and biofuel sectors that have given the country energy independence. President Juscelino Kubitschek successfully pushed the U.S. to support the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1958, as well as his proposal for U.S. assistance to Latin America called Operation Pan America (finally realized in 1961 with the Kennedy' Administration's Alliance for Progress), as ways to prevent communist takeovers in the region.³²

In the second half of twentieth century, three distinct grand strategic visions of how to achieve Brazil's status as a great power emerged: 1) Alignment with the U.S. and the West through 1961, and somewhat during 1985-2002; 2) "Independent Foreign Policy" seeking a leadership role in the Third World against the U.S. and the West, pursued 1961-64 by Presidents Janio Quadros and João Goulart, and, to a lesser extent, by current President Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva; and, 3) National Security Doctrine, followed by the military regime (1964-1985), of an integrated strategy of internal defense and economic development while being broadly aligned with the U.S. and the West.³³ All three grand strategies have sought independence of action for Brazil and,

as articulated by Philip Raine, “to move the country from a peripheral to a direct participant role in world affairs.”³⁴ All three have also involved confrontations of varying degrees with the U.S. As Ambassador Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima put it, “The nation needs to be psychologically prepared for evolution within a conflictive environment that is not necessarily one of rupture. It is an environment of confrontation, of opposing sides, of legitimate interests in shock within Brazil’s quest for foreign policy space.”³⁵

At the heart of the First World v. Third World debate is the question of identity: is Brazil a white-dominated, western-oriented democracy, or, as Jose Rodrigues argues, a mestizo republic (mix of Indian, African, European, and Asian) that is neither European nor Latin American whose destiny makes it allied with kin of the developing countries of Africa and Asia?³⁶ This debate was recently reignited when former Ambassador to the U.S., Roberto Abdenur, who was abruptly obliged to retire in January 2007, publicly criticized the “ideological conduct” of Brazilian foreign policy, stating that the Lula Administration’s South-South cooperation had occurred to the detriment of relations with the U.S. Abdenur accused Foreign Ministry Secretary General Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães of attempting to indoctrinate diplomats with “anti-imperialist” required readings and using ideological litmus tests in promotions, accusations denied by Guimarães and the Foreign Ministry.³⁷ Indeed, Guimarães has stated that Brazil must “react to the political initiatives...of the hyperpower” by “promoting political alliances with states of the periphery.”³⁸ Business groups and opposition politicians have also frequently criticized the Lula Administration’s foreign policy for paying excessive attention to the Third World at the expense of the U.S. and the developed world.³⁹

Brazil's Elements of National Power

Before examining specific strategies developed to execute the grand strategies discussed above, we first need to understand the elements of national power Brazil has at its disposal. The U.S. Army War College model describes the strategy formulation process as a mutually reinforcing calculation of national objectives (ends), strategic concepts (ways), and national power (means). The four elements of national power are diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. A mismatch among the three strategic components can lead to strategic failure. In Brazil's case, inadequate means to match ambitious ends have led to frequent frustration in moving toward the country's goal of great power status.

Diplomatic: Brazil has Latin America's most professional and able diplomatic service, with 92 embassies, 51 consulates, and six missions to international organizations throughout the world.⁴⁰ Brazilian diplomats undergo a rigorous training process and have excellent language skills. Brazil's Foreign Ministry, called Itamaraty after the Rio de Janeiro palace that served as its headquarters, is unusually powerful by Latin American and even U.S. standards. It has firm control of Brazil's foreign policy and is influential in other areas of national policy and in other levels of government as well, sending advisers to all other government ministries, a number of federal agencies, and many state governments and even municipal governments. Some business groups have complained that Itamaraty has too much power over trade negotiations, and opposition parties have advocated removing the Foreign Ministry as the lead trade negotiating agency.

Itamaraty vigorously defends the bedrock Brazilian values of respect for sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs, support for the United Nations and

other international organizations, and peaceful resolution of disputes. Brazil's policy of refusing to vote for any resolution naming a specific country, however, has led to situations where the country appears to be defending human rights abusers, such as the refusal to vote in the UN to hold the government of Sudan responsible for atrocities committed by its agents in Darfur.⁴¹ Despite its professionalism, Itamaraty suffered a series of embarrassing diplomatic defeats over the last several years when Brazilian candidates failed to get even much Latin American support in running for the presidencies of the World Trade Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Informational: Although Brazil enjoys a generally favorable international image, including as a fun-loving place of Carnival, beaches and soccer, the Brazilian government has weak informational capabilities. There is little coordination of the government's overall strategic communications, and senior officials often contradict one another. Brazil's private media concerns, though, have much more influence. The Globo television network has a huge audience inside the country and is the leading source of news, while Brazilian soap operas are exported to the rest of Latin America and elsewhere. Brazil has a dynamic music business and growing film industry, though production in the Portuguese language limits their impact outside the country. Brazil also has an important magazine and newspaper industry. Despite these formidable informational assets, however, Brazil has very little informational/cultural impact in the rest of Latin America or the rest of the world due to the language divide.

Military: With a strength of 288,000 (189,000 in the Army, of which 40,000 are conscripts; 66,000 in the Air Force; 30,000 in the Navy; and 1.34 million in the

reserves), Brazil has the largest military in Latin America. The Air Force, established as a separate service in 1941, has a mix of U.S., Brazilian, and French aircraft, including 55 F-5 fighters and 40 Brazilian-made AMX subsonic fighters. The Navy has the French-made aircraft carrier 'São Paulo' that carries 20 A-4 attack planes, five German Type 209 diesel submarines, and various other surface craft. The Army has a variety of U.S., Brazilian, and U.S. equipment, including 250 German Leopard tanks. According to its strategic planning documents (FT-2000 and FT-2015), the Army wants to focus on building up its intelligence, aviation (including buying Blackhawk helicopters), and electronic warfare capabilities.⁴²

Since the return of democracy in 1985, Brazil's armed forces have had their budget greatly reduced (only \$16.4 billion in FY06) and weapons modernization programs postponed, with the result that only one third of aircraft and less than one half of naval vessels are operational. President Lula recently promised to triple the arms acquisition budget to \$5 billion in 2008, 40 percent of which will go the Air Force to purchase a new fighter aircraft.⁴³ The Navy was promised an additional \$550 million in July 2007 to continue development of a nuclear-powered submarine, which Lula stated is needed to protect Brazil's offshore oil reserves.

From 1889, when elements of the Army overthrew Emperor Pedro II and established the Republic, to the end of the military government in 1985, Brazil's military (especially the Army) has had an active political role as "moderator" among various forces in the political system, a role previously exercised by the Emperor. The Army considered itself the "central agent of national unity and greatness."⁴⁴ Until 1988, Brazilian constitutions gave the military considerable discretion in obeying civilian

authority by requiring them to obey presidents “within limits of the law.”⁴⁵ Civilian political factions frequently asked for military intervention, and the Army forced regime changes in 1889, 1930, 1937, 1945, and 1964. The military government of 1964-1985 marked a departure from earlier interventions in that the armed forces remained in government after the coup, albeit with significant participation by civilians.

Since leaving government in 1985, Brazil’s military has undergone a remarkable transformation and now completely supports democracy. The military’s remaining policy influence is on certain sensitive areas such as the Amazon basin, the space program, maritime areas, nuclear energy, and arms production. With the end of the military rivalry with Argentina by the beginning of the 1990s, as articulated by Brazil’s 2006 National Defense Policy (*Política de Defesa Nacional*), the military has shifted its main focus to protecting the Amazon region by transferring units to guard the Northern Corridor (*Calha Norte*), where the Army now has about 60 percent of its forces deployed.⁴⁶ The System for the Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM) of radars, satellite receivers, and aircraft, was planned in 1990 and inaugurated in 2002 to help keep watch over a region Brazil considers vital to its national interests, partly driven by concerns of U.S. military involvement in support of Colombia’s fight against narco-guerrillas, as well as the possibility of spillover from the conflict. The other main thrust of the National Defense Strategy is defense of Brazil’s Atlantic Ocean economic resources, including the country’s main oil and gas reserves located offshore. The military also supports civilian authorities through civic action programs, security support for special events (e.g., large international sporting events and summits), and support of state law enforcement agencies in fighting drug gang violence (mainly in Rio de

Janeiro). Beyond the country's borders, Brazil's armed forces have participated in 26 United Nations missions (four of them ongoing), focused primarily in Latin America and Portuguese speaking Africa, as well as in a special border monitoring group along the disputed Ecuador-Peru border in the 1990s. Brazilian generals have commanded six of these missions, including the ongoing mission in Haiti and the Organization of American States mission in the Dominican Republic in 1965.⁴⁷

Economic: The opening up of the economy and macroeconomic stabilization in the 1990s has substantially enhanced Brazil's economic power. Several dozen world-class Brazilian companies trade on the New York Stock Exchange, and foreign capital continues to pour into Brazil's stock exchange and bond market. In August 2007, for the first time ever, more Brazilian capital was invested abroad than foreign capital came in, as companies such as Gerdau Steel, CVRD, and Petrobras made significant acquisitions and investments in the U.S. and around the world⁴⁸ Brazil is the largest investor in the Bolivian natural gas market, which put it in the uncomfortable position of being the leading "imperialist" investor when populist President Evo Morales nationalized gas reserves in May 2006. Self sufficiency in oil production in 2006 and an extensive biofuel program give Brazil energy independence, though structural problems in the electricity sector make it vulnerable to power shortages in coming years. Regarding the Government's instruments of economic power, Brazil offers low cost loans to poorer neighbors for infrastructure projects (requiring construction by Brazilian companies, of course). Brazil's generosity is not as appreciated as Brazilians believe it should be. For example, Brazilians believe they are giving Paraguay a good deal by giving that country half the output of the huge, binational Itaipu hydroelectric dam

(mostly financed by Brazil), which Brazil buys back, and are annoyed that the Paraguayans seem dissatisfied and want more.⁴⁹

Strategies to Secure Brazil's Borders and Occupy National Territory

In the next stage of the strategy formulation model, a country derives national policy from grand strategy and other policy pronouncements to provide guidance necessary for strategy formulation at all levels.⁵⁰ With regard to Brazil's core international and national security interest of establishing secure borders and territorial integrity, it is apparent that Portuguese colonizers and Brazilian successors established a national policy of preventing incursions by other European powers along Brazil's long and vulnerable coast and checking Spanish (and later Argentine) power in the south. Portugal/Brazil successfully employed strategies of diplomatic and military power to maintain unity, check rival Argentina through the establishment of buffer states (Uruguay and Paraguay), and delineate borders in jungle areas with other neighboring states through adroit diplomacy and coercion.

After the discovery of Brazil in 1500 and subsequent colonization, the Portuguese successfully fended off attempts by European rivals to dismember Portugal's New World colonies: the French were driven out of Rio de Janeiro in 1565 and out of Sao Luiz near the mouth of the Amazon in 1615; the Spanish had to abandon Sao Paulo in the 1520s and Santa Catarina in the south in 1560; and, in a campaign that is often cited as the beginning of Brazilian nationalism, the Dutch were driven out of Pernambuco in the northeast in 1654 by a coalition of locals from all social classes.⁵¹

In the conflictive southern frontier, the boundaries between Spanish and Portuguese territories were demarcated for the first time in the Treaty of Madrid of 1750,

which involved the exchange of land in Uruguay and Rio Grande do Sul. The Portuguese subsequently invaded Uruguay and annexed it 1820, only to be defeated by Argentine and Uruguayan troops, thus leading to a British-brokered treaty establishing an independent Uruguay in 1828. Brazil continued interfering in Uruguayan affairs and seized territory and formalized the right to intervene in a series of treaties signed in 1851.⁵² Brazil also interfered in Argentina's internal affairs when Brazilian troops helped Argentine rebels and Uruguayan troops defeat and overthrow Argentine President Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1852.⁵³ The bloody and costly War of the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay against Paraguay) of 1864-70, which saw Brazilian territory seized by Paraguayan troops in early defeats for the Brazilians, ended in the eventual total defeat of Paraguay and additional territory and favorable river navigational rights for Brazil.⁵⁴

Brazil's borders were definitively defined by the skillful diplomacy of Brazilian Foreign Minister Rio Branco (1902-12), whose strategy was based on the legal principle of possession of territory (*uti possidetis*) and on Brazil's large size compared to individual neighbors. For example, Brazil seized the 191,000 square kilometer jungle region of Acre in 1903 from Bolivia after Brazilian rubber tappers, who had migrated to the under-populated territory, revolted against Bolivian authorities and defeated three Bolivian military expeditions sent to quell the rebellion.⁵⁵

With regard to Brazil's second international and national security interest of effective occupation of national territory, fear of losing territory to outsiders or neighbors led to a national policy of occupying Brazil's vast spaces. Adventurers (*bandeirantes*) in search of gold and slaves, as well as Jesuit missionaries, pushed the frontier out in the

southeast/south and penetrated deep into the Amazon. During the mid-late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Brazil pursued strategies to encourage settlement in the southeast, south, and Amazon regions by enticing colonists from Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Slavic countries, Lebanon, Japan, and even defeated Confederates after the American Civil War.⁵⁶ While a number of colonies -- particularly in remote areas -- failed, the overall immigration policy was successful, and immigrants were assimilated into the overall Brazilian society. Brazil's government and military continue to show a concern sometimes bordering on paranoia about somehow losing control of the Amazon basin to the international community due to criticism of Brazil's handling of the environment and Indian affairs.⁵⁷

Strategies to Achieve Great Power Status

In order achieve to Brazil's third core international and national security interest of great power status, Brazil has established national policies to:

- 1) Integrate with the rest of South America as the region's natural leader;
- 2) Receive recognition from other great powers of Brazil's key role in world affairs;
- 3) Establish a recognized leadership role of the Third World;
- 4) Establish strategic partnerships with other emerging powers (especially China and India); and,
- 5) Develop a sufficient economic/industrial base to support great power status.

All three of the grand strategies already discussed (alignment with the West, Third World focus, and national security doctrine) have pursued all of these policies, though with considerable variation on the degree of emphasis given to each policy.

Integration with South America

After delineating borders with the neighbors, Baron Rio Branco initiated a strategy of closer relationships with the rest of South America while managing the rivalry with Argentina. In cooperation with the U.S., Brazil supported the Pan American movement that gave birth to the Organization of American States, supported the 1947 Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (providing for mutual defense), supported conflict resolution and democratization in the region, and participated in and led various UN and OAS military missions. Brazil was one of the guarantors of the 1942 boundary treaty (*Protocolo de Rio de Janeiro*) between Ecuador and Peru, playing a helpful role in monitoring their border after those countries fought in 1995 and hosting talks sponsored by the guarantors (Brazil, U.S., Argentina, Chile) that definitively ended the long-simmering boundary dispute in 1998. Brazil helped bolster Paraguayan President Juan Carlos Wasmosy when his government was threatened by a coup in 1996, and facilitated the safe exit of President Lucio Gutierrez after being forced from office in Ecuador in 2005. Brazil participated in the Central American peace processes of the 1980s/90s and was one of the Group of Friends that helped broker an agreement in 2003 between President Hugo Chavez and the opposition in Venezuela. Brazil has offered to help broker the release of hostages held by Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces (*FARC*) guerrillas. Regarding economic integration, Brazil has been a proponent of various economic agreements, including the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion, which established Mercosul, the common market of the southern cone including Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

Brazil's strategy of securing leadership in South America has not been more successful for several reasons. First is the fact that just because Brazil thinks it should

be the leader does not mean all the other countries want to follow. Brazil suffered humiliating defeats in recent years in the elections for the presidencies of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Inter-American Development Bank, partly because it failed to properly line up Latin American support; in the case of the WTO election, Brazil callously ignored the previously established candidacy of Mercosul partner Uruguay.⁵⁸ When Uruguay recently requested help from Brazil in getting Argentina to back off from a confrontation over paper mill investments, Brazil declined to get involved. Virtually no country in South America supports Brazil's quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Second is the competition for regional leadership from fiery populist Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Brazil's attempt to coopt Chavez by allowing Venezuela to join Mercosul without pre-conditions has backfired. Chavez constantly steals the limelight at meetings, urges unhelpful changes to Mercosul's rules, and threatens the integrity of the organization that is the centerpiece of Brazil's attempt to lead South America. Brazil's larger project of the South American Community of Nations is hopelessly stalled and irrelevant due to Chavez's posturing and an overall lack of consensus on how to proceed.

Recognition from World Powers

Brazil joined the Allies in World War I partly out of a desire to participate on the world stage, though it was only able to send a hospital unit to France and a few ships out on patrol in the South Atlantic. Brazil was disappointed at being relegated to secondary status in peace negotiations, and at being denied a permanent seat on the League of Nations Permanent Council (largely due to opposition from other Latin American countries),⁵⁹ leading to Brazil's withdrawal from the League in 1926. After

playing both sides up to the last minute, Brazil joined the Allies in World War II and sent troops to Italy in return for arms and a loan to start Brazil's steel industry. Brazil is dissatisfied with the current United Nations structure and, along with Germany, Japan, and India, is campaigning for a permanent seat on the UNSC as part of its campaign for recognition as a great power. On trade matters, Brazil is a leader of the developing G-20 countries in ongoing global trade negotiations. Nonetheless, Brazil continues to be unhappy about the perceived lack of respect and recognition from the world's leading powers.

Third World Leadership

Brazil spends considerable effort outside South America cultivating support for its global ambitions. High-level visits to and agreements with Portuguese speaking countries in Africa, other countries in Africa, Central America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia extend Brazil's global political reach but bring few economic or other benefits.

Cultivation of Other Emerging Powers

Brazil is a major trading partner with China, with which it has cultivated a "strategic relationship" as part of its strategy of leveraging power with the First World. As an example of the failure to consider the possible risk in the development of strategies, Brazil made a key concession in 2004 by recognizing China as a market economy, much to the chagrin of the Brazilian business community because it made counter-measures on trade complaints more difficult. The perceived quid pro quo of support for Brazil's UNSC bid did not materialize, however, when, in order to spite Japan, China subsequently announced it would not support any enlargement of the UNSC.⁶⁰ Brazil

has also tried to cultivate a strategic relationship with India, including creating a CEO Business Forum; India, however, has so far preferred to focus on more specific issues of mutual interest.⁶¹ In 2006, India, Brazil and South Africa formed the tripartite IBSA Dialogue Forum. Brazil has also tried to cultivate Russia, with which it has signed several agreements, including one on space cooperation.

Expansion of Industrial Base

President Getulio Vargas observed in the early stages of World War II that “only nations sufficiently industrialized and able to produce necessary war materials within their own borders can really be considered military powers.”⁶² Brazil successfully implemented strategies to develop a steel industry, an aircraft industry, an arms industry (though it partially collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s⁶³), a biofuels industry, self-sufficiency in petroleum, and diversified industrial and agroindustrial sectors. All of these successes helped boost Brazil’s independence of action and international prestige. On the other hand, costly pursuit of the trappings of great power status has been much less successful and demonstrates the large gap between overly ambitious ends and woefully inadequate means. Brazil was the first and only country in Latin America to have pre-WWI dreadnoughts, whose only action was in 1910 when mutinous crews shelled Rio de Janeiro.⁶⁴ Possession of several generations of aircraft carriers, which rarely have left port, seems another unnecessary and expensive power projection weapon. Brazil entered into a nuclear bomb race with Argentina that was thankfully aborted in the late 1980s.⁶⁵ Nuclear energy and space launch capabilities are more legitimate goals, but both have suffered delays and setbacks, including a tragic

explosion of a rocket that took over 20 lives, due to chronic lack of funding and numerous technical problems.

The pursuit of a nuclear powered submarine is the best example of a questionable defense project in pursuit of the image of being a great power. Despite having cheaper options for coastal defense with diesel submarines, Brazil has already sunk \$1 billion on the project, and President Lula recently committed another \$550 million. In February 2008, former fierce rivals Brazil and Argentina announced the joint development of a nuclear submarine in order to reduce costs and share any eventual technology benefits. Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim stated that South American militaries are fundamentally “deterrent rather than expansionist ...but that deterrence power can only be exercised if there is behind it a regional military industry that makes us independent of foreign supplies.”⁶⁶

U.S.-Brazilian Relations: A Rocky Relationship

Brazil and the U.S. are similar in many ways, both being continental-size countries with colonial and immigrant heritages, a sense of frontier and limitless possibilities, and the historical burden of African slavery⁶⁷ and mistreatment of native populations. Both are firmly planted in Western culture and support democracy, human rights, and the free market. Yet the bilateral relationship has often been strained, as Brazil has sought its own path to greatness, which much of the Brazilian elite seem to believe can only be achieved at the expense of the U.S. Brazil resents being dealt with on the same level as poorer countries (another ‘B’ country in Latin America after Belize and Bolivia) and demands recognition as a nascent major power. Nonetheless, both countries share many interests and have worked well together on a number of occasions. According to

Ronald Schneider, the once-special relationship that started with the “unwritten alliance” with the U.S., initiated by Baron Rio Branco in the early twentieth century to reduce British influence, could flourish only as long as the U.S. was still focused mainly on the Western Hemisphere and Brazil depended primarily on the U.S. market, a condition that did not survive much past World War II.⁶⁸

The history of U.S.-Brazil relations is long and eventful. Brazilian conspirators against the Portuguese crown (1788-89) looked to the U.S. Declaration of Independence for inspiration, and one of them corresponded with and even met in France with Thomas Jefferson.⁶⁹ In 1824, the U.S. was the first country to recognize Brazilian independence. President Grover Cleveland helped arbitrate a boundary dispute between Brazil and Argentina in 1889. Economic ties grew as the U.S. became the largest importer of Brazilian coffee by the 1920s. After German U-boats sank 14 Brazilian ships killing almost 700 persons in the first half of 1942, Brazil declared war on Germany and provided important military bases, rubber, and 25,000 troops that fought under U.S. command in Italy.⁷⁰ The close relations during the war years soured afterward when Brazil felt the U.S. reneged on promises to fund development projects without strings attached. After a period of anti-American foreign policy in 1961-64, relations become close again during the early years of the military government in the fight against communism, a time when U.S. Ambassador Charles Elbrick was kidnapped by leftist guerrillas in 1969. Relations soured again in the mid-1970s when the U.S. criticized Brazil’s deal with West Germany to gain nuclear technology that could be diverted to develop nuclear weapons, and when the Carter Administration criticized human rights abuses.

Relations since the return of democracy have been bumpy but mostly cordial, with friction mainly over trade and investment issues. Other irritants arise from Brazil's apparent need to demonstrate its equal status with the U.S. For example, Brazil is the only country in Latin America to require a visa for all American visitors, despite the protest of the Brazilian tourist industry that the country is needlessly losing business by making it more difficult for Americans to visit. In addition, following the implementation in 2003 of the requirement that all visitors bearing visas entering the U.S. had to be fingerprinted and photographed for security reasons, Brazil became the only country to reciprocate by demanding that all American visitors be similarly processed, despite having no security reasons for doing so.⁷¹ Notwithstanding such actions and perennial Brazilian complaints of neglect, the two countries have maintained high-level contact through the years: U.S. presidents have visited Brazil 11 times since 1936,⁷² while Brazilian presidents have visited the U.S. a number of times as well.

Peter Hakim of the Inter-American Dialogue, who calls Brazil the U.S.' "reluctant partner," recommends against pushing Brazil too hard, declaring that the U.S. has a greater stake in President Lula's domestic success than in the outcome of any particular issue. Hakim notes that Brazil prefers pragmatic and opportunistic cooperation with the U.S., without appearing to support the U.S. automatically. He continues that Brazil's opposition to specific U.S. policies (as opposed to overall goals) is more reflective of its self-conception as one of the world's most important countries.⁷³ Indeed, the U.S. Government has been taking a conciliatory approach over the last several years. Initial concerns about the 2002 election of leftist Lula da Silva have been replaced by confidence in his ability to manage the economy soundly and recognition of Brazil's

stabilizing influence on the rest of the continent. Despite their different backgrounds and political inclinations, Presidents Bush and Lula have developed a warm personal relationship, with President Bush most recently visiting Lula in Sao Paulo in March 2007, followed by a reciprocal visit by President Lula to Camp David within a month. As a result, Brazil and the U.S. -- the world's two largest producers of ethanol, agreed to cooperate in biofuel development and to share technology with developing countries in the region.⁷⁴ The two countries have also expanded bilateral business-government cooperation through the Treasury Department-sponsored Group for Growth and the Commerce Department-sponsored Commercial Dialogue and CEO Forum (group of leading corporate heads from both countries). Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Christopher McMullen recently summed up the official U.S. view of Brazil as a “regional leader and global partner” playing a constructive role in advancing a regional agenda based on democratic values, emphasizing “our strategic partnership” on biofuels cooperation and Brazil’s leadership of the UN stabilization mission in Haiti.⁷⁵

Conclusion

Sustained by its vision of a destiny of greatness, Brazil has made remarkable progress in consolidating its democracy, building a sound macroeconomic framework, diversifying its economy, and exerting itself on the world stage. Brazil’s quest for greatness is held back, however, by ongoing problems of social inequalities, poor education and health care systems, the collective drag on the economy of the Brazil Cost, underdeveloped political and social institutions, and rampant corruption. In what it considers its own backyard, Brazil faces serious challenges in establishing itself as the

leader of South America in the face of Venezuela's grandstanding President Chavez, not to mention resistance from all the other countries who resent Brazil's self-appointed role as regional leader, even as they recognize Brazil's economic and diplomatic strength. Regarding the instruments of national power needed to fulfill the country's goals, Brazil's strong diplomacy is being aided by growing economic strength, while Brazilian informational power has the potential of being better harnessed. "Right-sizing" and properly funding the Brazilian military with the right equipment and organization will make the armed forces more capable in fulfilling national defense goals and allow greater participation in international peacekeeping missions.

Brazil's main strategic challenge is to avoid dispersion of effort, to better focus what resources it does have on fewer objectives that are more realistic and might result in less frustration. Fundamentally, Brazilians must still decide what their international role should be, whether the leader of the Third World, or a junior member of the First World. With regard to U.S. relations with Brazil, patience and persistence seem to be the best course. Both countries fundamentally support the same goals in the region and the world and agree more often than not. Giving Brazil its international space and isolating and minimizing differences while working together where interests coincide offer the best chance for a more productive, less contentious relationship.

Endnotes

¹ James Brooke, "Brazil Aspires to Big League in More Than Soccer," *New York Times* (9 February 1990) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 13 November 2007.

² U.S. Army War College, *National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive, Academic Year 2008* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy 2007), 3-5.

³ *Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil*, 1988, Preamble, Articles 1-4; available from <http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html>; Internet; accessed 13 November 2007.

⁴ Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil: Culture and Politics in a New Industrial Powerhouse* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 215.

⁵ Darcy Ribeiro, *The Brazilian People: The Formation and Meaning of Brazil*, trans. Gregory Rabassa (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2000), 321-22.

⁶ Thomas Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 172. Afonso Celso announced the “dawn of our greatness; we will be the second or first power in the world.”

⁷ Robert J. Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1991), 235. One ordinary citizen exclaimed: “If we can do that, we can do anything!” The optimistic excitement of the times was captured on the inaugural plaque of the new Presidential Palace in Brasilia: “Here on this high central plateau – in the midst of this loneliness – that tomorrow will be the center of the great decision of our national life. I have cast my eyes once again towards the tomorrow of my country, and I face that oncoming dawn with unbreakable faith and a confidence that knows no bounds on its great destiny.”

⁸ Marshall C. Eakin, *Brazil, the Once and Future Country* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 259.

⁹ Richard D. Lewis, *When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures*, 3rd ed. (Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey International, 2006), 541.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Rex A. Hudson, ed., *Brazil: A Country Study*, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1998), 130.

¹² Joseph A. Page, *The Brazilians* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1995), 486.

¹³ Jose Honorio Rodrigues, *The Brazilians: Their Character and Aspirations*, trans. Ralph Edward Dimmick (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1967), viii.

¹⁴ Eakin, 260.

¹⁵ Rodrigues, 82.

¹⁶ Ibid., 57.

¹⁷ Ibid., xix.

¹⁸ Philip J. Skuta, *Poker, Blackjack, Rummy, and War: The Face of American Strategic Culture*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 1.

¹⁹ Celso Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future," *Daedalus* 129, (Spring 2000): 207. Concerning the idea of the western frontier, Lafer quotes Jose Guilherme Merquior's description of Brazil as "another West; a poorer, more enigmatic, more problematic West, but no less the West." President Vargas also declared that "the true path of Brazilian nationality lies to the West."

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

²² *Ibid.*, 7.

²³ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁴ R.S. Rose, *One of the Forgotten Things: Getulio Vargas and Brazilian Social Control, 1930-1954* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 94.

²⁵ Philip Raine, *Brazil: Awakening Giant* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1974), 220.

²⁶ Rodrigues, 69-101.

²⁷ Brazilian wags came up with this imaginative description because a chicken can fly in an upward arc only a short distance before coming down again, thus the image of abrupt ups and downs in the economy.

²⁸ "Dois meses tensos em Sao Paulo," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 12 July 2006 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.estadao.com.br/arquivo/cidades/2006/not20060712p28620.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008. The PCC launched three waves of attacks (May, July and August 2008) against security officials and the civilian populations of Sao Paulo city and cities throughout the state. During the May attacks, which were the worst, 73 prisons rioted simultaneously, 27 police were killed, hundreds of buses were burned, and 107 criminals were killed.

²⁹ Lincoln Gordon, *Brazil's Second Chance: En Route toward the First World* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 221. Gordon argues that Brazil's first chance to enter the First World during the Second Republic (1946-64) was unsuccessful due to political problems. Brazil has a second chance with the economic stability achieved since 1994.

³⁰ U.S. Army War College, *National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive, Academic Year 2008*, 3.

³¹ Lafer, 9.

³² Alexander, 282-296.

³³ Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 13-27. The Doctrine of National Security and Development was devised by the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra), which was established in 1949 with help from the U.S. Army, which had a professorship there until 1961. The leading

theorist of the doctrine was general Golbery do Couto e Silva. The doctrine's Grand or General Strategy must "coordinate, within a strategic concept, all of the political, economic, psychosocial (including institutions of civil society), and military activities that may lead to the achievement of the objectives that embody the national aspiration toward unity, security, and growing prosperity." The economic model's goal was to achieve economic development through complete integration of the national territory and complete security. "The main focus of the economic model is the strengthening of Brazil's productive potential so as to increase its bargaining power in the global geopolitical arena."

³⁴ Raine, 211.

³⁵ Scheider, 217.

³⁶ Raine, 215.

³⁷ "Ex-Brazilian Ambassador to USA Criticizes Foreign Policy, Chavez," *Agencia Estado News Agency* (27 February 2007) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 21 November 2007.

³⁸ "The Diminishing of Brazil," *The Economist* (13 May 2006) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 21 November 2007.

³⁹ "Representantes da industria criticam politica externa," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 21 June 2006 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.estadao.com.br/arquivo/economia/2006/not20060621p36210.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 march 2008.

⁴⁰ *Brazilian Ministry of External Relations Home Page*, available from <http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/>; Internet; accessed November 13, 2007.

⁴¹ "Apos Vitoria na ONU, Sudao fara acordo com Petrobras," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 14 December 2006 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.estadao.com.br/arquivo/economia/2006/not2006062114p40470.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 march 2008. Brazil joined African and Arab countries, as well as long-time human rights abuser China and Cuba, in voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council against a European-sponsored resolution calling on Sudan to investigate and punish those government authorities responsible for the atrocities in Darfur. Fellow Mercosul members Argentina and Uruguay voted for the proposal. Instead, the Council, with Brazilian support, voted only to send a mission to the region to investigate allegations.

⁴² "Brazilian Armed Forces Structure," *Military Periscope* (1 January 2008) [database on-line]; available from Military Periscope; accessed 13 February 2008.

⁴³ "Security, Brazil," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – South America* (11 February 2008) [database on-line]; available on Janes's; accessed 26 February 2008.

⁴⁴ Hudson, 341.

⁴⁵ *Idib.*, 57.

⁴⁶ Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, *Politica de Defesa Nacional* (Brazil: Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2005); available from http://www.defesabr.com/Md/md_pdm.htm; Internet; accessed 6 February 2008.

⁴⁷ "United Nations Missions," *Military Periscope* (October 2007) [database on-line]; available from Military Periscope; accessed 13 February 2008.

⁴⁸ "Brazil: Outward FDI Reaches Record Highs," *Oxford Analytica* (2 November 2007) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 13 November 2007. In the 12 months to August 2007, Brazil invested \$28 billion abroad, while foreign direct investment of \$27.7 billion came into Brazil.

⁴⁹ "Campanha no Paraguai poe Itaipu na mira," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 24 February 2008 [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.estadao.com.br/economia/not_eco129669,0.htm; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008.

⁵⁰ U.S. Army War College, *National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive*, Academic Year 2008, 3.

⁵¹ Skidmore, 12.

⁵² Rex A. Hudson and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., *Uruguay: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1992), 14.

⁵³ James D. Rudolph, ed., *Argentina: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1995), 29.

⁵⁴ Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., *Paraguay: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1990), 27-29.

⁵⁵ Waltraud Q. Morales, *A Brief History of Bolivia* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2003), 90.

⁵⁶ T. Lynn Smith, *Brazil: People and Institutions* (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 1972), 398-405.

⁵⁷ *Correio Brasiliense*, May 30, 2007 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://busab2.correio/2007/05/30alb.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008. The Brazilian Government blocked the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, sponsored by USAID, under suspicion that participating NGOs would be involved in espionage. General Maynard Marques Santa Rosa, the Defense Ministry's Secretary for International Affairs, was quoted: "Some of these NGOs are used quite easily and cheaply for intelligence gathering by foreign intelligence agencies. This is known because the secret services of the UK and US have been working in this region." Gen. Santa Rosa said he first learned of foreign interests in the Brazilian Amazon while studying at the U.S Army War College, where he graduated in 1989. He claimed there are 100,000 NGOs of all kinds operating in the Amazon without any control from the Brazilian Government.

⁵⁸ Mario Osava, "Lula's Foreign Policy Under Fire on a Number of Fronts," *Global Information Network* (22 April 2005) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 13 November 2007.

⁵⁹ Skidmore, 96. President Artur Benavides declared that gaining a seat on the Permanent Council of the League of Nations was “a question of national dignity.”

⁶⁰ “China da sinal de apoio ao Brasil na ONU,” *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 13 November 2004 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.estadao.com.br/arquivo/economia/2004/not20041113p23656.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008.

⁶¹ “Brazil/India: Lula Visit Fails to Boost Bilateral Ties,” *Oxford Analytica* (11 June 2007) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 13 November 2007.

⁶² Rose, 242.

⁶³ The Brazilian defense establishment is concerned about the decline of Brazil’s arms industry, and the Government issued its National Defense Industry Policy (Politica Nacional da Industria de Defesa) on July 19, 2005, calling for an expanded defense industrial base.

⁶⁴ Skidmore, 89. The mostly black enlisted crews mutinied against their white officers over whipping and embarrassed Foreign Minister Rio Branco with noise of shelling in the middle of lunch with senior British officials as he tried to convince them how modern Brazil was.

⁶⁵ Hudson, 449-50. In 1975, Brazil began a secret program code-named “Solimoes” (also known as the Parallel Program) to develop nuclear weapons by transferring technology from the German nuclear energy project. In October 1990, President Collor formally exposed and halted the military’s secret plan to develop an atom bomb, and a subsequent congressional investigation revealed that two bombs had been designed (but never produced), one 20-30 kilotons, and a second of 12 kilotons. Brazil and Argentina entered into a series of agreements to cooperate in the peaceful development of nuclear energy, and both countries signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which bans nuclear weapons in Latin America and went into effect in 1995.

⁶⁶ “Paper: Argentina, Brazil Eye Nuclear Sub,” *BusinessWeek*, 25 February 2008 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D8V1E6080.htm>; Internet, accessed 3 March 2008.

⁶⁷ Skidmore, 17. Brazil received more African slaves than any other region in the Americas (including the U.S.), an estimated 3.65 million. The slave trade was not ended until 1850, under pressure from the British Navy, and slavery was not finally abolished in Brazil until 1888.

⁶⁸ Schneider, 207.

⁶⁹ Skidmore, 32.

⁷⁰ John W.F. Dulles, *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1967), 234-36.

⁷¹ Larry Rohter, “Tourist-Minded Rio Resists Fingerprinting of Americans,” *New York Times* (13 January 2004) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed November 13, 2007. Fingerprinting and photographing of Americans was ordered by a federal judge in Mato Grosso who was outraged by the U.S. measure as “violating human dignity, xenophobic, and worthy of the worst horrors of the Nazis.” The Brazilian media remembered that Foreign Minister Celso Amorim had been “humiliated” in January 2002 when he was obliged to remove his shoes for

inspection upon entering the U.S. Many officials in the Presidential Palace and Foreign Ministry were reportedly very happy by the judge's order. The order was apparently quietly allowed to drop.

⁷² The first known meeting was between Emperor Pedro II and President Grant at the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876. FDR visited Brazil in 1936 and 1943; Truman in 1947; Eisenhower in 1960; Carter in 1978; Reagan in 1982; George H.W. Bush in 1990 and 1992; Clinton in 1997; and George W. Bush in 2005 and 2007.

⁷³ Peter Hakim, "The Reluctant Partner," *Foreign Affairs* 83 (January/February 2004), 114 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 13 November 2007.

⁷⁴ Deb Reichmann, "U.S., Brazil Plan to Cooperate on Trade," *Washington Post* (1 April 2007) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed on 13 November 2007.

⁷⁵ Christopher McMullen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, "U.S.-Brazil Relations: Forging a Strategic Partnership," Speech to U.S.-Brazil Business Council, *Federal News Service*, (17 October 2007) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 21 November 2007.

